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ABSTRACT
We address a fundamental problem that is systematically encountered when modeling complex systems: the limitedness of
the information available. In the case of economic and financial networks, privacy issues severely limit the information that
can be accessed and, as a consequence, the possibility of correctly estimating the resilience of these systems to events such
as financial shocks, crises and cascade failures. Here we present an innovative method to reconstruct the structure of such
partially-accessible systems, based on the knowledge of intrinsic node-specific properties and of the number of connections
of only a limited subset of nodes. This information is used to calibrate an inference procedure based on fundamental concepts
derived from statistical physics, which allows to generate ensembles of directed weighted networks intended to represent the
real system—so that the real network properties can be estimated with their average values within the ensemble. Here we
test the method both on synthetic and empirical networks, focusing on the properties that are commonly used to measure
systemic risk. Indeed, the method shows a remarkable robustness with respect to the limitedness of the information available,
thus representing a valuable tool for gaining insights on privacy-protected economic and financial systems.
Introduction
The estimation of the structural properties of a complex network when the available information on the system is incomplete
represents an unsolved challenge,1,2 yet it brings to many important applications. The most typical case is that of financial
networks, whose nodes represent financial institutions and edges stand for financial ties (e.g., loans or derivative contracts)—
the latter indicating dependencies among the institutions themselves, allowing for the propagation of financial distress across
the network. The resilience of the system to the default or the distress of one or more institutions considerably depends on the
topology of the whole network;3–5 however, because of confidentiality issues, the information on mutual exposures that regula-
tors are able to collect is very limited.6 Systemic risk analysis has been typically pursued by reconstructing the unknown links
of the network using maximum entropy approaches.7–9 These methods are also known as “dense reconstruction” techniques
because they assume that the network is fully connected—an hypothesis that represents their strongest limitation. In fact, not
only real networks show a largely heterogeneous distribution of the connectivity, but such a dense reconstruction was shown
to lead to systemic risk underestimation.2,9 More refined techniques like “sparse reconstruction” algorithms2 allow to obtain
a network with arbitrary heterogeneity, however they still underestimate systemic risk because of the homogeneity principle
used to assign link weights. A more recent approach10,11 instead uses the limited topological information on the network
to be reconstructed in order to generate an ensemble of graphs using the configuration model (CM)12—where, however, the
Lagrange multipliers that define it are replaced by fitnesses, i.e. known intrinsic node-specific features.13 The average values
of the observables computed on the CM-induced ensemble are then used as estimates for the real network properties. The
latter approach overcomes the heterogeneity issue described above, yet it only allows to reconstruct systems in which each tie
is undirected and unweighted—thus limiting the analysis to unrealistic and oversimplified configurations. Indeed, link direc-
tionality has been shown to play an important role in contagion processes and percolation analysis over these systems14,15 by,
e.g., speeding up or confining the infection with respect to the undirected case. Since real economic and financial networks
are, by their nature, directed, links directionality has to be taken into account when assessing their robustness to shock and
crashes. Moreover, the connection weights between the entities of these systems often assume heterogeneous values, which
in turn strongly affect the way such entities react to the default or distress of their interacting partners.4
In order to achieve a realistic and faithful reconstruction of economic and financial networks, here we develop an improved
procedure that allows to reconstruct links directionality, and at the same time we implement a simple yet effective prescription
to assign link weights. Our method can thus be employed specifically for systemic risk estimation, by assessing those topo-
logical properties that have been shown to play a crucial role in contagion processes and in the propagation of distress over a
network: the k-core structure,16 the percolation threshold,17 the mean shortest path length18 and the DebtRank.4 In particular,
we perform an extensive analysis in order to quantify the accuracy of our method with respect to the size of the subset of nodes
for which the topological information is available. Validation of the method is carried out on benchmark synthetic networks
generated through a fitness-induced CM, as well as on two representative empirical systems, namely the International Trade
Network (WTW)19 and the (E-mid) Electronic Market for Interbank Deposits.20 In both cases, we have full information on
these systems and we can thus unambiguously assess the accuracy of the method in describing them.
Method
Before explaining our method in detail, let us introduce some notation. We will deal with weighted directed networks, i.e.,
graphs composed by a set V of nodes (with |V |= N) and described by a weighted directed adjacency matrix—whose generic
element wi→ j represents the weight of the connection that runs from node i to node j. The incoming total weight or in-strength
for a generic node i is then defined by sini = ∑ j∈V w j→i, whereas, its outgoing total weight out-strength reads souti = ∑ j∈V wi→ j .
It is also convenient to introduce the binary directed adjacency matrix that describes the binary topology: ai→ j = Θ[wi→ j] (Θ
is the Heaviside step function: Θ[a] = 1 for a > 0 and Θ[a] = 0 otherwise). This allows to define node i’s number of incoming
connections or in-degree kini = ∑ j∈V a j→i and number of outgoing connections or out-degree kouti = ∑ j∈V ai→ j. Finally, the
binary undirected adjacency matrix—whose elements are obtained as ai j ≡ a ji = Θ[wi→ j +w j→i]—is used to define the
number of incident connections or undirected degree of node i: ki = ∑ j∈V ai j ≡ ∑ j∈V a ji.
Given these ingredients, our network reconstruction method works as follows. Let us suppose to have incomplete informa-
tion about the topology of a given network G0. In particular, suppose to know the in-degree and out-degree sequences {kini }i∈I
and {kouti }i∈I only for a subset I ⊂V of all nodes (where |I|= n < N). Moreover, suppose to know a pair of intrinsic properties
{χi}i∈V and {ψi}i∈V for all the nodes—that will be our fitnesses (see below). The method then invokes a statistical procedure
to find the most probable estimate for the value X(G0) of a given property X computed on the network G0, compatible with
the aforementioned constraints. We build on two important hypotheses.
I) The network G0 is drawn from an ensemble Ω induced by a directed CM21—meaning that Ω is a set of networks that are
maximally random, except for the ensemble averages of the in/out-degrees {〈kini 〉Ω}i∈V and {〈kouti 〉Ω}i∈V that are constrained
to the observed values {kini }i∈V and {kouti }i∈V , respectively.12 The directed CM prescribes that the probability distribution
over Ω is defined via a set of Lagrange multipliers {xi,yi}i∈V (two for each node), whose values can be adjusted in order to
satisfy the equivalence 〈kini 〉Ω ≡ kini and 〈kouti 〉Ω ≡ kouti , ∀i ∈ V .21 The values of xi and yi are thus induced by the in- and out-
degree of node i, respectively. The role of {xi,yi}i∈V in controlling the topology is better clarified by writing explicitly the
ensemble probability for a directed connection between any two nodes i and j:12
pi→ j ≡ 〈ai→ j〉Ω =
x jyi
1+ x jyi
, (1)
so that xi (yi) quantifies the ability of node i to receive incoming (form outgoing) connections.
II) The fitnesses {χi}i∈V and {ψi}i∈V are assumed to be linearly correlated, respectively, to the in-degree-induced and
out-degree-induced Lagrange multipliers {xi}i∈V and {yi}i∈V through universal (unknown) parameters α and β : xi ≡ √αχi
and yi ≡
√βψi, ∀i ∈V . Therefore eq. (1) becomes:
pi→ j =
√
αχ j
√β ψi
1+
√
αχ j
√β ψi =
zχ jψi
1+ zχ jψi
, (2)
where we have defined z ≡
√
αβ . Such an hypothesis is inspired by the so-called fitness or hidden-variables model,13 which
assumes the network topology to be determined by intrinsic properties associated to each node of the network. Note that this
approach has been already used in the past to model several empirical economic and financial networks,20,22 possibly within
the CM framework assuming a connection between fitnesses and Lagrange multipliers.23
These two hypotheses allow us to map the problem of evaluating X(G0) into the one of choosing the optimal CM ensemble
Ω induced by the fitnesses {χi}i∈V and {ψi}i∈V , that is compatible with the constraints on G0—given by the knowledge of
{kini }i∈I and {kouti }i∈I . Indeed, because of the limited available information, finding the CM of the real system12 is impossible,
and we thus have to impose it by assigning ad hoc values to the Lagrange multipliers—whence the name of “fitness-induced”
CM (FiCM). Once the FiCM ensemble Ω is determined (it is univocally defined by the set {xi,yi}i∈V , and thus by the set
{χi,ψi}i∈V ), statistical mechanics of networks prescribes that the quantity X(G0) typically varies in the range 〈X〉Ω ±σΩX ,
where 〈X〉Ω and σΩX are respectively average and standard deviation of property X estimated over Ω.12 We can thus use 〈X〉Ω
as a good estimation for X(G0). In practice, since we know the fitness values {χi,ψi}i∈V , in order to determine unambiguously
the ensemble Ω we need to find the most likely value of the proportionality constant z that defines Ω according to eq. (2). This
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can be done using the partial knowledge of the degree sequences to estimate the appropriate value of z through a maximum-
likelihood argument,22 i.e., by comparing, for the nodes in the set I, the average number of incoming and outgoing connections
in the ensemble Ω with their in-degrees and out-degrees observed in G0:
∑
i∈I
[〈kini 〉Ω + 〈kouti 〉Ω]= ∑
i∈I
[
kini + kouti
]
. (3)
In the above expression, 〈kini 〉Ω = ∑ j( 6=i) p j→i and 〈kouti 〉Ω = ∑ j( 6=i) pi→ j contain the unknown parameter z through eq. (2), and
since {χi,ψi}i∈V and {kini ,kouti }i∈I are known, eq. (3) defines an algebraic equation in z, whose solution allows to build the
FiCM ensemble and, at the end, to obtain an estimation of X(G0)—even with the knowledge of the in- and out- degree of just
a single node.
Summing up, the algorithm works as follows. Given a network G0, two fitness values χ and ψ for each of the N nodes,
and the in-degrees and out-degrees only for a subset I of |I|= n < N nodes:
• we compute the sum of the in-degrees and out-degrees of the nodes in I and use it together with the fitnesses {χi,ψi}i∈V
to obtain the value of z by solving eq. (3);
• using such estimated z and the fitnesses {χi,ψi}i∈V , we generate the ensemble Ω by placing a directed link from a given
node i to a given node j with probability pi→ j of eq. (2);
• we compute the estimate of X(G0) as 〈X〉Ω ±σΩX in the FiCM ensemble, either analytically or numerically (i.e., by
measuring it on networks drawn from Ω).
Note that the numerical generation of a sample network from Ω consists in building a binary directed adjacency matrix, so
that its generic element ai→ j = 1 with probability pi→ j (i.e., the existence probability for the link from i to j given by eq. (2))
and ai→ j = 0 otherwise. Finally, once the network is generated, in order to obtain a weighted topology we place ∀i, j a weight
w˜i→ j on the directed link from i to j (provided its existence, i.e., ai→ j = 1) according to the following prescription:
w˜i→ j =
χ j ψi
W pi→ j
ai→ j ≡ 1W (z
−1 + χ j ψi)ai→ j , (4)
where the last equality comes from eq. (2). In this expression, the normalization W represents the induced total weight of
the network, defined as the geometric mean of the sum of the fitnesses: W =
√
(∑i χi)(∑i ψi). Indeed, W corresponds to the
ensemble average of the total network weight: W ≡ ∑i j〈w˜i→ j〉Ω, where 〈w˜i→ j〉Ω = (χ j ψi)〈ai→ j〉Ω/(W pi→ j) = (χ j ψi)/W is
the ensemble average for the weight of the link from i to j.
Remarkably, thanks to this procedure to assign link weights, the ensemble averages of a node i’s total in-strength 〈sini 〉Ω =
∑ j∈V 〈w˜ j→i〉Ω and out-strength 〈souti 〉Ω =∑ j∈V 〈w˜i→ j〉Ω turn out to be directly proportional to χi and ψi, respectively and ∀i∈V .
This suggests a natural way for selecting appropriate quantities to play the role of fitnesses in our method: the straightforward
interpretation for χ and ψ is that of nodes in-strengths and out-strengths observed in the real network G0. Indeed, the
assumption χi = sini and ψi = souti , ∀i ∈V , brings to W = ∑i∈V χi ≡∑i∈V ψi, and finally to the important equivalences 〈sini 〉Ω ≡
sini and 〈souti 〉Ω ≡ souti . This means that we successfully preserve, on average, the strength sequences of the real network G0
(and thus its total weight). In other words, our network reconstruction method calibrated on in/out strengths is based on a
null model constraining the in-degree and out-degree sequence of a subset of nodes, together with the relative in-strength and
out-strength sequence (see Figure 1).
Empirical Dataset
In order to test our network reconstruction method, we use two representative empirical systems of economic and financial
nature. The first one is the international trade network of the World Trade Web (WTW),19 i.e., the network whose nodes are
the countries and links represent trade volumes between them: thus, wi→ j is the monetary flux from country i to country j (the
“amount” of the export from j to i). The second one is the (E-mid) Electronic Market for Interbank Deposits:20 in this case,
the nodes are banks and a link wi→ j from bank i to bank j represents the amount of the loan that i granted to j.
In the following analysis we will use and show results for WTW trade volume data of year 2000, and E-mid aggregated
transaction data of year 1999 (both temporal snapshots correspond to the largest size of the network). Analyses for other annual
snapshots are reported in the Supplementary Information, and bring to comparable results. In the light of the discussion
at the end of the previous section, we will use as fitnesses χi (ψi) the real node in-strength sini = ∑ j∈V w j→i (out-strength
souti = ∑ j∈V wi→ j), i.e., the total import (export) volumes of countries for WTW, and with the total liquidity borrowed (lent)
by banks for E-mid. Note that the goodness of any choice for the fitness values must be first validated according to hypothesis
II of our method (see the first part of section Results).
3/10
100 101 102 103 104 105 106
s
in
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
<
si
n >
100 101 102 103 104 105 106
s
out
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
<
so
u
t >
101 102 103 104 105
s
in
101
102
103
104
105
<
si
n >
101 102 103 104 105
s
out
101
102
103
104
105
<
so
u
t >
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 1. Conservation of the strength sequences. Scatter plots of node in-strengths sin and out-strengths sout observed for
the real network G0 and their ensemble averages obtained from eq. (4). Upper panels (a,b) refer to WTW, lower panels (c,d)
to E-mid.
Topological Properties
As stated in the introduction, we will test our network reconstruction method focusing on the network properties (each playing
the role of X in the discussion of section Methods) which are commonly regarded as the most significant for describing the
network resilience to systemic shocks and crashes. We first consider two properties defined for undirected networks (in order
to reconstruct these properties, we use the undirected version of the method10):
• Degree of the main core kmain and size of the main core Smain, where a k-core is defined as the “largest connected
subgraph whose nodes all have at least k connections” (within this subgraph), and the main core is the k-core with the
highest possible degree (kmain).24 The main core is relevant to our analysis as it consists of the most influential spreaders
(of, e.g., an infection or a shock) in a network.16
• Size of the giant component SGC at the bond percolation threshold p∗ = ¯k−1 (¯k is the mean degree of the network),
where bond percolation is the process of occupying each link of the network with probability p, and p∗ is the critical
value of p at which a percolation cluster containing a finite fraction of all nodes first occurs.17 Note that the percolation
threshold at p∗ = ¯k−1 (that we take as reference value) is a feature proper of homogeneous graphs in the infinite volume
limit, whereas, for scale-free networks in the same limit it is p∗ → 0. Note also that a bond percolation process can be
mapped into a SIR model with infection rate β and uniform infection time τ . In fact, by defining the trasmissibility
T = 1− e−τβ as the probability that the infection will be transmitted from an infected node to at least a susceptible
neighbor before recovery takes place, the set of nodes reached by a SIR epidemic outbreak originated from a single
node is statistically equivalent to the cluster of the bond percolation problem (with p ≡ T ) the initial node belongs to.25
We then move to properties defined for directed graphs:
• Link reciprocity r, measuring the tendency of node pairs to form mutual connections. It is defined as the ratio between
the number of bidirected links and the total number of network connections: r = (∑i j ai→ ja j→i)/(∑i j ai→ j). Reciprocity
is considered a sensible parameter for systemic risk, giving a measure of direct mutual exposure among nodes.
• Average shortest path length λ ,18 where the shortest path length λi→ j from node i to node j is the minimum number
of links required to connect i to j (following link directions), and λ = N(N − 1)/(∑i6= j λ−1i→ j) (the harmonic mean is
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commonly used to avoid problems caused by pairs of nodes that are not reachable from one to another, and for which λ
diverges). This quantity measures the number of steps that are required, on average, for a signal or a shock to propagate
between any two nodes of the network.
• The Group DebtRank DR,4 a measure of the total economic value in the network that is potentially affected by a distress
on all nodes amounting to 0<Φ < 1, with Φ = 1 meaning default. In a nutshell, DR is based on computing the recursive
impact (i.e., the reverberation on the network) of the initial distress, and is defined as:
DR = ∑
i
(h∗i − h0i )νi (5)
where h∗i is the final amount of distress on i (h0i = Φ) and νi is the relative economic value of i. We refer to the original
paper4 for the details on how to compute DR.
Results
Test of FiCM modeling
When testing our network reconstruction procedure it is important to keep in mind that the method is subject to three different
kind of errors. The first one comes from hypothesis I that the real network G0 can be properly described by a CM, whose
Lagrange multipliers are obtained by constraining the whole in-degree and out-degree sequences.12 The second one derives
instead from hypothesis II that the node fitnesses {χ ,ψ}i∈V are proportional to the CM’s Lagrange multipliers {x,y}i∈V , i.e.,
from imposing a FiCM. Finally, the third one is due to the limited information available for calibrating the FiCM and obtain
the true value of z—namely, the partial knowledge of the in-degree and out-degree sequences. Note however that the first
source of mistakes cannot be controlled for in our context, as finding the CM that describes the data requires the knowledge
of the whole in-degree and out-degree sequences (which is not accessible for our case studies). This is exactly why we have
to make hypothesis II and impose a FiCM by assigning ad hoc values to the Lagrange multipliers. In this section we thus
concentrate on the second source of errors.
Indeed, real networks are not perfect realizations of the FiCM and can only be approximated by it.22 In order to assess
qualitatively how well this FiCM describes the real network G0, one can compare the observed in-degrees and out-degrees of
G0 with their averages 〈kini 〉Ω and 〈kouti 〉Ω computed on the FiCM ensemble Ω. Figure 2 shows such comparison when the
average degrees are obtained through eq. (2) for a fully informed FiCM, i.e., with the value of z computed via eq. (3) using
the knowledge of in- and out-degrees for all nodes. We indeed observe a remarkable agreement between these quantities for
our empirical networks: the real degrees are scattered around the functional form of their expected values. The amount of
deviations from perfect correlation (which would correspond to an actual realization of the FiCM) gives an indication of how
well our model describes the real network. Note that the validity of hypothesis II can be evaluated also in the case of partial
information by performing such comparison on the subset I of nodes whose topological properties are available.
In the following, in order to have a quantitative global assessments of the errors caused by hypothesis II, we will test
our network reconstruction method both on real networks and on benchmark synthetic networks numerically generated with
the fully informed FiCM through eq. (2). In the latter case, the errors made by the method will be due only to the limited
information available about the degree sequences. It is then interesting to check whether such generated synthetic networks
are equivalent to the real networks in term of systemic risk. Figure 3 shows that bond percolation properties, shortest path
length distribution and DebtRank values of synthetic networks are in excellent agreement with those of their real counterparts
(the correlation coefficients between real and synthetic curves are all above 0.99). FiCM thus proves itself to be a proper
framework for modeling our empirical networks.
Test against limited information
In this section we finally proceed to the key testing of the method against the third (and more relevant) source of errors: the
limitedness of the information available on the degree sequences for calibrating the FiCM. In order to obtain a quantitative
estimation of the method effectiveness in reconstructing a topological property X of a given a network G0 (which can be either
the real one or its synthetic version), we implement a procedure consisting in the following operative steps:
• Choose a value of n < N (the number of nodes for which the in- and out- degrees are known).
• Build a set of M = 100 subsets {Iα}Mα=1 of n nodes picked at random from G0.
• For each subset Iα , use the degree sequences from G0 to evaluate z from eq. (3), and name such value zα .
• Build the ensemble Ω(zα) using the linking probabilities from eq. (2): generate m = 100 networks from Ω(zα ), and
compute the average value Xα of property X on this ensemble.
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Figure 2. Qualitative assessment for FiCM description of the real network G0. Scatter plots of node fitnesses {χ ,ψ} versus
real node in- and out-degrees {kin,kout} of G0 (red circles) and their ensemble averages computed via the FiCM (blue
asterisks). Upper panels (a,b) refer to WTW, lower panels (c,d) to E-mid.
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Figure 3. Properties of real and synthetic networks. Left plots (a,d): dependence of the size of the giant component SGC on
the occupation probability p (the vertical dotted line indicates p∗). Central plots (b,e): probability distribution of the directed
shortest path length λ . Right plots (c,f): dependence of DR on the initial distress Φ. Top panels (a,b,c) refer to WTW, bottom
panels (d,e,f) to E-mid. Correlation coefficient values c between real and synthetic curves: (a) c = 0.999, (b) c = 0.999, (c)
c = 0.994, (d) c = 0.999, (e) c = 0.989, (f) c = 0.998.
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• Compute the relative root mean square error (rRMSE) of property X over the subsets {Iα}Mα=1:
ρ [X ] = rRMSEX ≡
√
1
M
M
∑
α=1
[
Xα
X(G0)
− 1
]2
(6)
where X(G0) is the value of X measured on G0.
We then study how the rRMSE for the various network properties we consider varies as a function of the size n of the
subset of nodes used to calibrate the FiCM (i.e., for which in- and out- degree information is available). Results are shown in
Figures 4 and 5. We observe that in most of the cases there is a rapid decrease of the relative error as the number of nodes n
used to reconstruct the topology increases. For instance, generally the error drops to half of the starting rRMSE (for n = 1) at
n/N = 5%, and to one quarter for n/N = 10%—a value that is rather close to that of the final error made at n ≡ N. This is
an indication of the goodness of the estimation provided by our method. As expected, the rRMSE is higher for real networks
than for synthetic networks, and the difference between the two curves gives a quantitative estimation of the error made in
modeling real networks with the FiCM. The fact that such a difference is higher for E-mid than for WTW is directly related
to a slightly better correlation between real and expected degrees observed in the latter case (Figure 2). Note that the various
rRMSE for synthetic networks do not necessarily tend to zero, because the generated synthetic configuration might be highly
improbable—in some cases, the synthetic network can be even more atypical than the real one. We thus indicate with error
bars the range of performance of our method for different choices of synthetic G0.
Generally, SGC, λ , kmain and Smain are the properties which are reconstructed better: for instance, with the knowledge of
only 10% of the nodes, all the relative errors become smaller than 10%, and they decrease for increasing n. The rRMSE
for r and DR show instead a behavior almost flat in n. The fact that the rRMSE for r computed for real networks remains
steadily high is probably due to the fact that reciprocity is hardly reproduced by a directed CM, and is better suited as additional
imposed constraint.26 The rRMSE for DR is instead remarkably small for real networks (with values around 0.5%), and we can
thus conclude that our method is efficient in estimating DR also when the available information is minimal. This is particularly
relevant to our analysis, since we are estimating DR at its peak (i.e., at its maximum, and thus mostly fluctuating, value), where
the details of the weighted topology play a fundamental role in the process of risk propagation. Besides, and more importantly,
the value of DR for the real network is computed using the original weighted topology, whereas, the computation of DR in the
reconstructed network builds on link weights obtained by the simple prescription of eq. (4).
In conclusion, the outcome of this analysis is that our network reconstruction method is able to estimate the network
properties related to systemic risk with good approximation, by using the information on the number of connections of a
relatively small fraction of nodes—as long as the fitnesses of all nodes is known.
Discussion
In this paper we studied a novel method that allows to reconstruct a directed weighted network and estimate its topological
properties by using only partial information about its connection patterns, as well as two additional intrinsic properties (inter-
preted as fitnesses) associated to each node. Tests on empirical networks as well as on synthetic networks generated through a
fitness-induced configuration model reveals that the method is highly valuable in overcoming the lack of topological informa-
tion that often hinders the estimation of systemic risk in economic and financial systems. Indeed, the information exploited
by the method is minimal but is (or should be) publicly available for these kind of systems.
Our work originates from the study of Musmeci et al.,10 that represented a first attempt in tackling the problem of network
reconstruction from partial information within the framework of fitness-induced configuration models. Here however we
make fundamental improvements to the method, the key advance being that of extending it to directed weighted networks (the
most general class of networks). In the present form, the method is then suited to reconstruct high-order network properties
related to systemic risk, a task of primary practical importance the method was conceived to address—that was however far
beyond the reach of its original version. Besides, the validation of the fitness-induced configuration model approach to model
real networks, as well as the reconstruction of benchmark synthetic networks generated as fitness-based counterparts of the
empirical networks, are both novel ingredients that allow to assess quantitatively the accuracy of the method. Last but not
least, the extensive analysis of different temporal snapshots of the real networks we provide in the Supplementary Information
allows to strengthens considerably the effectiveness and robustness of our method.
We remark that the method we are proposing here, by reproducing both the binary and weighted topology of the network,
represent a substantial step forward in the field of network reconstruction. In fact, most of the previous works6–9,21 focused
on reproducing the strengths of the real network to the detriment of connection patters, whereas, only recently it has been
realized that a successful reconstruction procedure must resort also on topological constrains.2,10 Here we are proposing a
method that allows to always reproduce the strengths, but also to tune the network topology through appropriate connection
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probabilities. In this respect, the use of probabilities derived from degree constraints represent the most general case, which
include as specific instances both the dense reconstruction techniques6–9 (obtained for pi→ j = 1 ∀i 6= j ∈ V ) and the sparse
reconstruction method2 (roughly obtained for pi→ j = 1−λ ∀i 6= j ∈V ).
Note that one should not be much surprised that the knowledge of a small number of nodes allows to precisely estimate a
wide range of network properties, because the method assumes the additional knowledge of the fitness parameters for all the
nodes. Besides, the effectiveness of the method strongly depends on the accuracy of the fitness model used to calibrate the CM
in order to fit the empirical dataset. In the case of WTW and E-mid, the fitness model well describes how links are established
across nodes, and our method is thus effective in reconstructing the network properties. Finally, we remark that the issue of
having limited information on the system under investigation, while being typical for social, economic and financial systems
(that are privacy-protected), is very relevant also for biological systems such as ecological networks, metabolic networks and
functional brain networks—where, due to observational limitations and high experimental costs for collecting data, detailed
topological information about connections is often missing. Notably, our method can be used to reconstruct any network
representing a set of (directed and weighted) dependencies among the constituents of a complex system, and we thus believe
it will find wide applicability in the field of complex networks and statistical physics of networks.
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